<Articles> Domestic Anarchy :To wards A Constitutive Model of State Disintegration by Adem SEIFUDEIN
<Articles> Domestic Anarchy :To wards A
Constitutive Model of State Disintegration
著者（英） Adem SEIFUDEIN
journal or
publication title
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and
Pol ics
volume 32
page range 327-366
year 2002-03-29
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00155999
Domestic Anαrchy: Towαrds A Constitutive 
Model of Stαte Disintegration 
Seifudein Adem 
Introduction 
This essay is a companion to another one appeared in this 
journal (No. 29/ 2000) bearing the title ‘Social Order in World Poli-
tics'. In the course of comparing the nature of political units that 
make up the international system， that essay touched upon issues 
pertaining to the characteristic features of individual 'citizens' in 
contemporary states and the relevance of this to social disorder in 
domestic politics. In this essay we take that discussion further by 
shifting the level of analysis to collectivities of individuals or com-
munal groups within contemporary states. Our main concern here 
will nevertheless be limited to a demonstration of the dialectic of 
domestic anarchy rather than a comparative analysis of social order 
in domestic and world politics. 
Even though it can be argued that domestic politics has always 
been potentially more anarchic than its international counterpart， it
was only in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War that the fear 
of such a phenomenon assumed a global dimension. J The interna-
tional situation in the last decade seemed also to have borne out 
such a fear， although authoritative voices which claim that ‘ethnic 
warfare is on the wane，日 orthat ‘ethnic war essentially does not ex問
ist同 havegradually begun to be heard. And yet in a number of 
places different groups stil continue to challenge states and de今
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their authority." Examples of such places include， some Andean 
countries， South East Turkey， Egypt， Algeria， Sri Lanka and India.5 
With varying degrees and forms， similar challenges could be ob-
served in most of 'the post向colonialstates，' which G. Sorensen has 
defined as， 'the weak and unconsolidated states in the periphery， 
which are often in an ongoing state of entropy.附 Thelist notably in・
cludes many states in sub-Saharan Africa， as well as the twenty or 
so states that came into being after the disintegration of the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia， and‘most of which have no tradition 
of statehood or practice in間住government'.' Thus， itmay indeed 
be true to say that the world has witnessed in the last decade the 
deepening of the trend towards domestic anarchy. 
It sounds a litle hyperbolic， but some analysts have even ar幽
gued that in the wake of the end of the Cold War the world has ex-
perienced its first period of turbulence since the birth of the state 
system some 350 years ago.' Such views in part explain the surge 
in interest among international relations analysts in domestic anar-
chy， a subject that had hitherto been mainly the preserve of the dis-
ciplines of comparative politics and area studies. The growing in-
terest also reflects the significant transformation in the notion of in帥
ternational臼ecurityitself. Yet there stil seems to be greater co任
cern with the immediate， albeit undoubtedly important， question of 
what ought to be done about states that have failed， orare poised to 
fail， as a result of domestic anarchy than with the more academic 
and demanding task of trying to comprehend the dynamics of do-
mestic anarchy itself.9 Our own purpose in this essay is to attempt 
to take a small step towards bridging this gap by carefully trying to 
put together the relevant pieces of the works by various political 
scientists， and deductively constructing what may be called a consti-
tutive modelJO of domestic anarchy. When we say a deductively con-
structed model， we mean one that can be methodologically defended 
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on the basis of what James Rosenau has called ‘potential 
obsrevability'.l1 
Whαt isDomestic Anαrchy? 
We use the term domestic anarchy here in the most basic sense. It 
is used interchangeably with state failure to denote a situation in 
which a central government's power to discharge its ‘crucial' func-
tions is progressively eroded or curtailed as a result of revolutionary 
wars， ethnic wars， genocides or politicides and/or adverse or disrup-
tive regime changes.12 The ‘crucial' functions of a government in-
clude: 
sovereign control of a territory; soverei♂1 supervision (though not neces-
sarily ownership) of the nation's resources; effective and rational revenue 
extraction from people， goods and s巴rvices;the capacity to build and main目
tain an adequate national infrastructure (roads， postal ser、rices，telephone 
systems， railways and the like); the capacity to render such basic services 
as sanitation， education， housing， and health care; and the capacity for 
governance and the maintenance of law and order. l:l 
The relationship/distinction between the concepts of state fail幽
ure， state disintegration and state collapse also needs to be clarified. 
We might think of the phenomena represented by these terms as 
being situated respectively on a continuum in which state failure 
comes before both state disintegration and state collapse since a sig-
nificant breakdown in any one of the ‘crucial' functions listed above 
could be regarded as symptomatic of state failure. Consequently， for 
a state to disintegrate the breakdown in those ‘crucial' functions 
should encompass more or less al spheres of its activities. Put sim-
ply， a state collapses when it is unable to sustain itself as a state. 
A broad consensus exists to the effect that the proliferation of 
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communal movements14 that challenged state authority in recent 
years is explicable in terms of the reawakeninghヶekindlingof ethnic 
and national sentiments which had hitherto been smothered by 
Cold War politics. At various levels of generalizations， different ex-
planations have been advanced to make sense of the circumstances 
that foster or inhibit these movements. One theory maintains that 
the process of economic modernization leads 加 adivision of labor 
which has the potential to replace organically integrated society 
with mechanically integrated society.15 Ethnic identification， having 
been rendered dysfunctional， will therefore disappear. For the pro-
ponents of the opposing view modernization， rather than resulting 
in a new form of integration， increases ethnic group interaction that 
may heighten conflict. The reasoning involved in this aspiration is 
to the effect that as ascriptive ties lose their political relevance， un‘ 
integrated citizens， looking for an anchor in a sea of change， will 
grab hold of an increasingly anachronistic ethnic identity， which 
bursts onto the scene and then recedes as the process of structural 
differentiation moves toward a reintegrated society.'H 
History does not seem to vindicate the universality of either of 
these arguments. Underlying both theories is the implicit assump-
tion that ethnic or cultural heterogeneity or dualism is a sin qua 
non for ethnic conflict.17 We argue otherwise.IS We maintain that 
cultural homogeneity does not gua1'antee social peace. This view， 
while less popular， has a Iong pedigree. Hl This does not of course 
mean that‘modernization' arguments a1'e irrelevant to the analyses 
of domestic ana1'chy. Instead， what this means is that these ar伊"
ments are more or less plausible depending on individual cases and 
that a more useful theo1'y should be able， 01' at least aspi1'e to be 
able， toaccount for the phenomena over time and across societies. 
At a lower level of abstraction， some analysts have focused on 
the p1'ecipitating causes of violent communal conflicts and singled 
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics No.32.2002 
out different sets of factors that purportedly account for the erup-
tion of intrastate violence. Richard Shultz identified five major 
characteristics of groups involved in ethnic conflicts: that the 
groups are part of a severely divided society; that they see their 
differences with other ethnic groups as irreconcilable; that ethnic-
ity is a principal form of identification; that， in the extreme form， 
such groups lay claim to a specific piece of territory; and that the 
groups are subject to the manipulation of the elite.20 S. W. R. de 
Samarasinghe also pointed out that in general， the dynamics of eth-
nic conflicts suggest that given the appropriate conditions such as-a 
culturally homogeneous group， a‘homeland'， a common set of griev-
ances， political leadership and political mobilization etc.剛 asepara-
tist movement with modest aims that do not extend beyond devolu-
tion of power within the existing state can easily evolve into a ful 
blown secessionist movement.21 Druckman similarly observed that 
extreme attachments to ethnic， religious， national or clan identities 
lead to inhumane acts toward those perceived to be the enemy.22 
We propose to attempt below， among other things， toadvance a 
more parsimonious explanation anchored in--and based on--both 
positivist--not in the more metatheoretically rigid and unimagina拘
tive sense--and postmodernist epistemological foundation.2:3 Our as-
piration is not to advance a causal explanation of domestic anarchy. 
It is instead to take the first step towards this end by identifying 
what appear to be the dialectical components of domestic anarchy 
and sorting out the underlying patterns that link them. Once a 
model of what constitutes state failure is in place， we hope that a 
causal relationship among the variables could be sought out， and 
the dynamics of domestic anarchy， despite the ‘presence' of a central 
authority， elaborated more easily. This should ultimately pave the 
way for empirically ascertaining the correspondence between the de-
rivatives of the model and the realities in the politically turbulent 
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areas of the globe. 
Elements of Domestic Anαrchy 
The ultimate source of communal conflicts， which in many cases 
lead to domestic anarchy and emerge under a variety of circum-
stances and take various forms，24 is perhaps reducible to the crises 
of citizensh伊 αnd legitimαcy・叩 When these crises reach an acute 
level， they could lead to the total collapse of the institution of state. 
ln the following pages we will demonstrate the processes and stages 
through which the transformation of the crises takes place. But 
first it is appropriate旬 clari今thebuilding blocs of our hypothesis : 
its key concepts. 
A citizen is defined here quite simply as a member of a political 
community， entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with 
whatever responsibilities are attached to membership.'" As citizen-
ship is such an exprossion of membership in a community， its roal 
meaning has variod widely deponding on tho community and the 
historical poriod.山 Onoof tho basic questions which arises theroforo 
is whethof we can rofo1' in the same way and ac1'o日ssocioties to citi幽
zenship as the bonds that bind individuals into political community. 
We answe1' in the afi1'mative with some qualifications. Although it 
had not been in vogue at the time， J.P. Nettl had a1'gued decades 
ago that for analytic 1'easons stateness should be viewed as a quan帽
titative va1'iable according to which one could speak of a political 
entity as having mo1'e 01' less qualities of stateness.却 1nthis sense， 
it may be true1' to refe1' both to the principle and the 1'eal meaning 
of citizenship as similarly mo1'e or less developed. That is to say 
that the condition of citizenship ought to be judged by the degree to 
which its constituent elements are present.29 But it would be inco1'-
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rect to regard the notion of citizenship as something totally irrele-
vant to or absent in the minds of the 'peripheral' people. Citizen-
ship implies ful status in a political community， and it is developed 
to the extent that al sections of the population subject to common 
authority have certain political rights in common， including the 
right to participate in politicallife.30 
The other key concept in which our leading argument in this 
paper anchors itself is legitimacy.31 In the Weberian tradition of 
analysis， power relations are legitimate where those involved in 
them， subordinate as well as dominant， believe them to be SO.32 
David Beetham provides an alternative definition :官rpower to be 
legitimate， three conditions are required: its conformity to estab-
lished rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared 
beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate， or the most signifi-
cant among them， tothe particular relations of power.削 Wewould 
use the Weberian definition here， despite the criticism leveled at it 
by some34 rather than Beetham's since the former is as adequate as 
and yet more parsimonious than the latter and is therefore more 
useful in tackling the issue of legitimacy across historical societies. 
Less abstractly， there are two interrelated ways by which legiti-
macy of a government can be better evaluated and understood.35 
One way is by considering how a govemment came into being or the 
mechanism through which the political leaders assumed power. In 
this sense， governments which assume power through constitu-
tionaνlegal means are legitimate and those which do so otherwise 
are illegitimate. Legitimacy could also be judged on the basis of the 
policy outputs of those who govern. As S. Scharr notes， the regime 
or the leaders provide the stimuli， first in the form of policies im-
proving citizens' welfare and， second， inthe form of symbolic mate-
rials which function as secondary reinforcements， and the followers 
respond by assuming either a favorable or unfavorable attitude to・
?
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ward the stimulators.浦 lnshort， the central issues involved in po幽
litical outputs pe此ainto the questions of what values will be allo・
cated and who will benefit from them and who will be burdened by 
the particular configuration ofvalue allocations.37 
Judging the legitimacy of a ruling group by its policy output as-
sumes greater significance especially in‘post-colonial states' where 
government administration is generally less concerned with public 
goods and where both in出eoηrand practice the state is‘a so町田of
power， prestige， and enrichment for those clever or fortunate 
enough to control and staff it.制 Thereis also a growing indication 
that a trend is now emerging in which people increasingly judge the 
legitimacy of their leaders on the basis of policy outputs instead of 
solely on the mechanism by which politicalleaders assume power.拘
Clearly this has implications for theories that equate the presence 
of a central authority with order and its absence with anarchy. 
This essay postulates， itshould be reiterated here， that there is 
a constitutive link between the crises of citizenship and legitimacy 
on the one hand and the onset of domestic anarchy that， in some 
cases， could lead to state failure and its eventual collapse. What 
are the alternative mechanisms by which the mutation of peaceful 
communal movements into domestic anarchy can be forestalled四 d，
if conflicts somehow erupt， may be regulated? The tentative an・
swers to these questions will be given towards the end of the essay， 
but first it is helpful to lay down the framework for analyzing the 
distinct stages and the intricate processes that link the twin crises 
of citizenship and legitimacy on the one hand and the phenomenon 
of domestic anarchy on the other. 
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ProcessAnαlysis of Domestic Anαrchy 
The origin of communal conflicts could be traced 加 atleast as far 
back as the time of the Assyrians， around 610 B. C， when a coali-
tion of Babylonians， Medes， and Chaldeans began a rebellion 
against Sardanapalus to end the Assyrian rule.'o For analytic and 
practical purposes， however， the dialectical process of state failure 
could be thought to begin when a state comes into being in national 
or imperial form. Generally， a state comes into being through insti-
tution or acquisition. J. P. Nettl characterized the two processes of 
state formation as仕latof implosion and explosion respectively rep-
resenting a particularization or narrowing of sovereignty into ethni-
cally homogeneous or at least ethnically defined areas， and an ex-
tension of central autho1':ity across ethnic bounda1'ies and particular， 
hithe1'to sovereign. communities.41 
More than how states are created， however， itis how they a1'e 
ruled， 01' more p1'ecisely how thei1' rule is perceived by those who 
are ruled， which conditions the emergence of communal movements. 
Almost invariably， states that came into being as a result ofimposi-
tion from above or outside are multi-communal or have political 
boundaries that do not coincide with cultural boundaries. This 
means two things. Fi1'st， itmeans that free institutions are next to 
impossible to mold under the circumstances!2 This difficulty also 
hampers the eme1'gence and consolidation of legal and peaceful 
ways of ai1'ing dissenting views. Second， itmeans that the author-
ity of the state is likely to be pe1'ceived， 01' misperceived as exclusive， 
alien， arbitrary or a comb:ination of some or al of these.'3 In spite 
of this fact， or because of it， political leade1's would attempt to pro-
mote nationalism'4 with a declared goal of forging a nation cotermi-
nous with the state. It must be mentioned in passing that the 
meanings attached to nationalism in much schola1'ship and most po・
五
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litical discourse reveal more about the users of the term than about 
the phenomena."r， This definitional problem is compounded by the 
thinness of the theory of nationalism."6 Alexander Motyl has thus 
自ummedup the various definitions of nationalism : 
Nationalism may be a political ideology or ideal that advocates that nations 
should have t.hcir own sLates (01" en.1oy selt~rule); it may then be the belief 
that the world is divided into nations and that these divisions arc both 
proper and natural; it may be love of one's nation; and， finally it. may be 
thc belief th且tone's own nation should stand above al other nations. 1n 
日impleterms， these views of nationalism boil down respectively to the be晴
lie:fi月 inthe nation-state， inself~government， in national identity， inna-
tional wcll司beingand in natioual superiority.17 
The concepts of nation， state and nat“ion】1ム.-s
out def伍in出1託it“ionalpr叩obJems.A nation is understood here， inthe same 
sense as Benedict Anderson had defined it， as imagined community 
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.柑 Theterm 
state is used in the Weberian sense:‘a corporate group that has 
compulsory jurisdiction， exercises continuous organization， and 
claims a monopoly of force over a territoηand its population‘in-
cluding al action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction.'49 The 
ideal nation-state is where the political coincides with the cultural 
attributes of statehood. In other words， a natiorトstatepresupposes 
a congruity between the 'national' boundaries of the state and its 
‘political‘boundaries. Needless to say， the concept nation-state has 
also often been loosely， and sometimes inaccurately， used both in 
the academic and political discourse.5Il 
Coming back to the subject of nationalism， two types of nation-
a1isms could be identified from which political leaders might like to 
choose: civic and ethnic. As defined by Richard Shultz， civic naぬ
tionalism is an early variety based on a set of abstract principles of 
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civic responsibility; and ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism 
based on ethnic， and occasionally religious identity. The first form 
is more inclusive， that is citizenship is theoretically open to anyone 
who can meet the requirements for civic duty. In those states 
which promote the second variant of nationalism， citizenship can 
not be acquired without the appropriate ethnic or religious stamp.51 
With few exceptions， civic nationalism is ther叶o1'ethe officially p1'e-
ferred nationalism promoted by the 1'uling elite. 
It is thus fair to assume that at least at the 1evel of 1'hetoric 
virtually al states promote civic nationalism. That is p1'obably why 
most communal groups seem印 judgethe legitimacy of the autho1'-
ity of their governments not against what it says but rather against 
what it does or is perceived to do. Once ethnic rather than civic na-
tionalism is believed to hold sway in the face of the imagined or 
real threat emanating from the ethnic or religious self-centeredness 
of certain groups， political discontent would emerge. When the dis-
content gets politicized， the beneficiaries of the governmental policy 
outputs would begin to resent the reaction of the margina1ized 
groups. Correspondingly， the latte1' groups would fee1 relegated to a 
second class-citizen status， whi1e at the same time being maligned 
as 1ess than patriotic by the former. At this stage弔 asense of rela-
tive deprivation would begin to develop. Political scientist Ted 
Robert Gurr authored the theory of relative deprivation and defined 
its essence as 'actors' perception of discrepancy between their own 
uαlue expectαtions and their environment's apparent vαlue cαpαbil-
iわ1.'52C. D. Hah and J. Martin's le日sabstract definition of the level 
of relative deprivation is also based on this conception ;5:1 the level of 
relative deprivation represents the balance b日tweenthe goods and 
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled 
and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attain凹
ing or maintaining， given the socia1 means available to them. 
?
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However， for the臼enseof relative deprivation to emerge the 
situation need not necessarily and objectively be bad， inrelative 01' 
absolute terms. Many advocates of regional autonomy， observed 
Susan Olzak， tend to indulge in the rhetoric of economic and/or po・
litical subjugationヲevenin regions that are undergoing an economic 
boom.5" Neither the presence nor the absence of objective inequality 
leads to the corresponding appearance 01' non叩appearanceof a sense 
of relative deprivation and political discontent. What is more cru-
cial at this stage is the way the state of affairs is widely perceived. 
As Hah and Ma1'tin unde1'score警 inequalityengenders dysfunctional 
inputs to the political サnJyto the extent that they cause 
?
??
?
value expectations to outpace value capabilities. In this case， the 
elite could play a erucial 1'01ひ inthc construction of images and 
their portr勾川1to their fi:lllowers部日.1piricalrealities."" Once po・
litical diseontent and w主主主日 senseof relative deprivation are 
in place together with mutual distrust and warine呂田 among differ-
ent groups ()f 'citiz(汀lS宅 weεぇn日peakof a state as confronted with 
the crisc8 of legitit詑ac)'αndatizCIIship， a twin crises that reinforce 
each otherヘ
Afte1' the品心 criぉesare initiatedラthenext stage comes to the fore 
when the eommunal groups be符into load the political 
system with臼omethingresembling what Gabriel Almond has in a 
different context caHed d:ysfim.ctional inputs that cause changes in 
the eapabilitie.s of political日.ystem，in the conversion patterns and 
struetures， and in thむsocializationand recruitment functions.回 The
demands of communal movementsヲhereafterreferred to as dysfunc-
tional inpuJ.ぷ o!'simply inputs， could vary with respect to the direc-
tion in which they位。was well as their quantity， substance or con-
tentヲintensity，SOLH・ceand number of kind臼 affectingthe system at 
a given point> Also relevant to our analysis he1'e is the nature of 
the groups who advance these inputs. Ted GUrI噌 identifiedthe f01-
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lowing broad categories of groups that are involved in substantial 
conflict with the state: nations without state， communal contend-
ers for sta旬 power，militant sects， peoples of the frontiers and eth-
noclass. The orientation of these groups towards the state would be 
one or a combination of the following: a demand for recognition of 
the cultural distinctiveness of the group， reform of some aspects of 
the political system， fair representation at the center and attain-
ment of independent sta加hood. These orientations are re-
categorized under the more generic terms of control， access， accom幅
modation， and exit.57 It is true， however， that a group's orientation 
towards the state and the nature of its demand could， and in most 
cases would， change over time. It is to the discussion of the nature 
and source of these variations that we should now turn. 
The environment within which they are situated and operate 
profoundly a妊ectsthe behaviors of both states and communal move聞
ments. These contextual factors could be placed under the general 
rubric of the structural attributes of the international system. They 
include internationally and regionally recognized rules and norms 
such as those relating to the formation and recognition of states， 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and the in-
violability of their national borders. The principle of self-
determination also falls within this category. 
The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state， which is ingrained in the charter of the United N会
tions， isalso reflected in the legal documents of other regional or司
ganizations. Clearly， this principle works against communal move-
ments that seek to secede from an existing田tate.It should also be 
noted that although in theory this principle applies equally to both 
sides engaged in an internal conflict， the government日ideis only 
marginally affected， ifat al1， in its relations with other sovereign 
states. 
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The othe1' st1'uctu1'al att1'ibutes of the international system that 
have had significant bea1'ings on the o1'igin， development and out-
come of dysfunctional inputs to a political system we1'e colonialism， 
Cold Wa1' politics as well as its end. Colonialism played a signifi幽
cant 1'ole in setting the stage fo1' the crises of legitimacy and citizen-
ship in many‘post嶋colonial'states日 th1'oughthe a1'bit1'a1'Y p1'ocess by 
which it c1'eated these states. A 1'ema1'k by Lo1'd Salisbu1'Y， one of 
the B1'itish colonial a1'chitects in Af1'ica， illust1'ates this point : 
fwel have been eng日日巴din drawing lines upon maps where no white man冶
fot巴vertrod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes 
to each other， only hindered by the small imp刊limentthat we never knew 
exactly where the ll10untains and rivers and lakes were.印
It is thus clea1' that the disjullcture between state bounda1'ies 
and that of ethnic groups Jaid the basis fo1' the cri開 sof legitimacy 
and citizenship that engulfed many contempo1'ary states. It may 
also be said that these structural problem also made it difficult to 
introduce genuinely representative institutions. John Stua1't Mill 
noted generations ago that it is in general a necessa1'y condition of 
free institution， that the bounda1'ies of governments should coincide 
in the main with those of nationalitie日.川 Thefact that state-making 
proce日sb1'ought different peoples together that have nothing in 
common except， pe1'haps， the fact that they had been enemies in the 
past provided a fertile soil fo1' the sense of 1'elative dep1'ivation to 
eme1'ge and flourish.'" Yet despite the widesp1'ead awareness about 
the arbitrariness of colonial borders， post-independence leade1's of 
these states did almost nothing to change the territorial stαtus quo. 
Instead they institutionalized it by c1'eating norms that upheld the 
p1'inciple of the invi叫abilityof the existing borde1's. Measured by 
the degree of compliance with 1'egime Injunctions， particularly in In-
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stances where shortゐermor myopic selιinterests collide with re-
gime rules，62 the boundary cooperation system has proved to be 
strong. The logical question which arises， therefore， isthat if post司
independence leaders were fully cognizant of the fact， as Michel 
Walzer put it， that good fences make good neighbors only when 
there is some minimal agreement on where the fences should go，6" 
why did they choose to do nothing about it? 
Two contending theories address this issue. One is based on 
the neoliberal notion of ‘specific reciprocity'， initially advanced by 
Robert Keohane，64 and applied specifically to the issue under discus-
sion by Jefrey Herbst.'坊 Keohanedefined reciprocity as‘exchanges 
of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are 
contingent on the prior action of the others in such a way that good 
is returned for good， and bad [or bad.'66 Players are attracted to the 
principle of specific reciprocity when they realize that mutual coop-
eration can yield more satisfying results than mutual defection but 
in which temptation for defection also exists.1i7 Jefrey Herbst 
adapted Keohane's conceptual con日tructand argued that structural 
conditions which made post-independence elite insecure in their po・
sition and gave them litle control over the nation allured them to 
embracing the principle of specific reciprocity and created the bor-
der cooperation regime.68 In short， according to this theory， since 
most of the borders of post-colonial states are artificial and did not 
reflect demographic realities， the leaders realized that they are al 
uulner.αble if the Pandora's box of revising borders was opened up. 
Hence a lllutually unswerving support for the prese門前ionof the 
borders as demarcated by the ‘outsiders' and the corresponding gen-
eral denial of recognition and assistance to separatist and secession-
ist movements.69 
In general， the consequences of the prevailing structural attrib-
utes could be systematically analyzed by utilizing George Modelski's 
li 
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classificatory schema of the structure of a political system that are 
split into two in the case of internal war as those of authority， soli-
darity， culture and resources:lIl An authority structure includes the 
institutions and peoples that are engaged in authoritative decision-
making， their skills as well as the nature of the decisions made. 
This structure is important in that for a sense of relative depriva-
tion to emerge there should exist among a collectivity a belief that 
its members are unjustifiably disadvantaged. The elite in this re胸
gard play a crucial role in articulating this ‘disadvantage' or， ifit is 
not there， ininventing it. The feeling of being disadvantaged is a 
factor of paramount importance at least in the initial stage of a 
communal movement. It is perhaps no coincidence that most com-
munal movements make more of the fact that they are (were) the 
victims of inequality and discrimination than they do of any claim 
that their group presents the vestige of a nation.71 
The structure of solidarity， on the other hand， does not coincide 
with political boundaries. As a rule， itis eiも.herlarger or smaller 
than the latter and is very fluid in that the extent of its boundaries 
depends on the strength of the pressures from the other structures. 
As Heraclides elaborates， 
the prirnary targets of the secessionist land alωof the central govern-
rnent'sl activities for assistance include those that are considered to be 
within the‘日olidarityuniverse' because of ethnic or national identity， relig-
ion， ideology， Janguage， culture， race or history・Thenthere are those who 
are seen as likely supporters because they are well known historical ene田
rnies of the opponent groUp.72 
The structures of culture and communication encompass the 
li9 language and religion as well as self-image of the ac加rs. This 
structure is also instrumental in rallying support. The scope of this 
The T前日kubaUniversity Journ品1of Law and Politics No.32.2002 
structure is influenced by， and i日 sometimesparallel to， the struc-
ture of solidarity. Last， but not leastラ apolitica1 system has a re目
source structure that a1so extends beyond its political boundaries. 
These include domestic resou1'ce出， inte1'national alliances， access to 
military and economic aid and fo1'eign bases of operations. The 
aforementioned st1'uctures 1'einforce one anothe1' and are thus inter時
dependent. Fo1' instance， the availability of a fo1'eign base (an e1e-
ment of 1'e日ourcestructure) may dεpend on the empathy based on 
re1igion and ideology (elements of structure of culture). Simi1arly， 
the scope of the structn1'e of solidarity would significantly depend 
on the skill and styles of the decision..maker自 (aspectsof authority 
st1'uctu1'e). 
St1'uctural factors inf1u在日cenot the effect臼ofthe dysfunc-
tional inputs on the political sy臼加工11but a1so their defining features. 
What ultimate fonおお11Chan wouId take whether a 
group's orientation toward the state will be controL access 01' 
accommodation) depends on a host of 泊、iablesinduding whether or 
not economic， political and ideological means are available (part of 
re日ourcestructure) and on whether 01' not the communal gTOUp has 
compatriots on the other side of the border and叩 uldget moral and 
material support f1'om outside of structure). 
As indicated above， the st.ructural attributes of the interna嗣
tional system play a crucial l'ole in恥総rmmingand/or regulating 
involvement by external actoys in dom倒 tie設narchy. The motive of 
the outsiders in in a domestie (;ont1ict can be analyti-
cally divided into an Instrumeれもaland affective types : 
Instrumental motives include international politicai (inciuding general 
strategicl consider乳tions.shorιtenn乱ndlong.term伐のnomicmotives， and 
domestic political reasons incIuding必品r()f demonstration efects and short-
term military gain. Affective involvernent may be 1'01' reasons of justice， 
fi 。
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humanitarian considerations， ethnic， religious， racial 01' ideological affinity 
or personal白-iendshipsbetween top protagonists.':l 
In a nut白he]]，the normative structure of the internationaI sys“ 
tem influences outcomes of the dysfunctional inputs in either of the 
folIowing ways: diffusion and encouragement， isolation and sup-
pression， and reconciIiation，74 
States must enjoy a measure of legitimacy in order to survive 
as states，'九 Indealing with challunges to their legitimacy， the gov-
erning elite therefore should and would react in a variety of ways， 
Gabrie1 Almond gives three possible modes of reactions， namely 
adaptiveぅ rejectiveand substitutive，71、 WhatAlmond classifies as 
'adaptive' and ‘rejective' patterns of elite behavior respectively corre-
spond to Heraclides' policie臼of‘acceptance'and policies of‘denial'， 
and are elaborated as follow烏:
Denial includeH straLegies such乱sremoval or elimination (extermination， 
population transfer， expu!sion)， coercion (subjugation， state terrorism)， 
domination within a framework of institutionalized cultural divisions， as-
simi!ation as well as individualization of the problem by way 01' non-
discrin日nationand hurnan rights. Ac山 ptanceincludes the f()lIowing strate-
伊es'integration in thu sen問。fequal乱ndjoint contribution by both 
groups illvolved to a new superordinatc nation and culture; minority pro-
tection and safeguards， consociational demoCl羽 yin a unitary system; fed-
erali白mor extended autonomy， very loose feder且tionakin to confederation， 
l'edrawing ()f boundaries with a neighboring country (in case of irreden-
tism); and territorial part.ition， i， 
More often than not、itis not difflcult to identify the reactive 
pattem that is being fullowed by the elite. In 1ess cloar‘cut cases， 
one might consider looking at whether what Stephen van Evera has 
called the three principal val'Ieties of chauvinist myth making are 
present， They ar8 selfglori~ying， self-whitewashing and other噂
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maligning.78 In most cases， these varieties of myth開makingexhibit 
features of rejective pattem of elite reaction to inputs considered 
dysfunctiona1. In other cases， they constitute the rejective pattem 
itself. Theodr Hanf distinguishes between five possible forms of re-
active patterns， namely， partition， domination， assimilation， conso・
ciation and political syncretism.79 
There is a good deal of overlap between the different sets of re-
active patterns listed above but Almond's parsimonious c1assifica-
tion appears to be preferable for the purpose of analyzing the phe-
nomena of domestic anarchy. In general， therefore， patterns of re-
action of elite to inputs considered dysfunctional may be identified 
by answering the following questions: Do the elite yield or adapt to 
the dysfunctional demands and adjust their policies accordingly? Do 
they decide to ignore or reject the demands and adopt a policy of in-
differenc氾?Or do they自ubstitute?(i.e.， respond positively but not 
necessarily in a way the initiators of the dysfunctional inputs had 
sought.) As stated above， the way in which the elite choose to react 
to an input considered dysfunctional is also mediated by the struc-
tural attributes of the system as well as the nature of the dysfunc-
tional inputs itself. 
There seems to be no magic formula according 加 whichone 
could prescribe a particular reactive pattern as being the most‘ra-
tional' for dealing with a given dysfunctional input， for effects of 
any form of reaction depend in large part on the depth of the crises 
of legitimacy or citizenship， as well as the nature of the dysfunc-
tional inputs they are meant to address. It needs to be stressed， 
however， that it is the interplay between the changing nature of the 
dysfunctional inputs， the structural attributes of the system!subsy自陣
tem and the reactive patterns of the elite that would ultimately dか
termine whether the fate of the state would be consolidation or fail-
ure; or whether order or anarchy would prevail. If the latter is the 
間
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case， itis possible that the political unit would fal into a Hobbesian 
state of nature after wmch it may well be re-invented. The alterna-
tive scenario is a consolidated state. In either case， at this stage， 
the dialectical process of state formation and domestic anarchy will 
have come ful circle. And yet these phenomena should not be 
thought of as a process always destined to reach a final， predeter-
mined goal but instead as an ongoing， continuous and extremely 
uneven process of formation、consolidationand failure and in some 
cases a total collapse of state. 
In conclusion of this sf:gment of our discussion， we seek to re楢
emphasize that， first， tho pre同 nceof a central law-making and law-
enforcing body does not make domestic politics any 1ess anarchic 
than international politics in which such legal mechanism is obvi岨
ously lacking. Second， we have also sought in this essay to shed 
some light on the dynamics of domestic anarchy by identifying the 
constituent variables and then sketching the relationships among 
them. From a methodological standpoil1t， these tasks could be 
thought as repre日entingan initial step toward developing a plausi判
ble explanation of the phenomenon of domestic anarchy. The next 
task involves converting these variables into indicators that are 
more amenable to quantitative analyses and determining the extent 
of correlation and causation， ortheir absence， among them. The re-
sult of this process would bo the vindication or falsification of the 
hypotheses constitutInεthe deductively developed mode1 that would 
contribute to a better understanding of domestic anarchy. From the 
point of view of the logical consistency of the major propositions and 
their premise， ifthe model makes sense future researchers might 
wish to proceed to refine it along the steps broadly suggested above 
and empirically asct，rtain the correspondence between the deriva-
tives of the model and the reality. Furthermore， itmight be useful 
to consider using quantitative and qualitative analysis of events 
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and historical data to determine which combination of these vari-
ables results in which outcome and under which circumstances. 
The cumulative result of more refined comparative analyses should 
provide the basis for developing a causal theory of domestic anarchy 
which would be useful for a better understanding of the dynamics of 
domestic anarchy. What we have tried to do in this essay is merely 
to suggest a general constitutive model of domestic anarchy the 
variables of which could be broken down further to make them ame-
nable to a more rigorous analysis. 
Constitutive and causative models could be thought to repre-
sent two consecutive steps in a scientific process in which case the 
former becomes incomplete without the laUer; the latter becomes 
impossible without the former. And as such， although analytically 
separable， the two are closely interrelated in practice. Moreover， as 
the preceding discussions indicate a given constitutive model almost 
always implies a causative relationship among the component vari-
ables although we have attempted to make it a litle more explicit. 
Similarly， in the following paragraphs we shall c1arify by way of 
conclusion the normative implications of such a model. 
Conclusion 
Over the years a plethora of measures have been suggested as pos-
sible cure for the problem of state failure and domestic anarchy. At 
the risk of oversimplification，SO it is worthwhile noting that realist， 
liberal， functionalist and legalist schools in International Relations 
respectively approximate the broader paradigmatic orientations of 
the views discussed below.削 Fordealing with state failure， one 
variant of realism suggested ‘strategies that would involve signifi-
cant changes in international legal and diplomatic practices.'拙 This
??
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schoo1 considers unquestioned support for the principle of the invio-
Iability of existing borders as the mqjor cause of the problem: 'if se司
cession was a viable threat [in AfricaJ， as had been during the pre-
colonial period， politicians would have a profound incentive to reach 
accommodation with disaffected populations， especialIy those that 
were spatially defined， lest they threaten to leave the nation-state.制
Liberals also make a case for supporting secessionist causes， but for 
a different reason: '[i]n particular cases，' the argument goes，‘liberal 
values may be served by those who seek to break up multinational 
states rather than by thoso who seek to preserve them.'8! In general， 
fo1' realism the ultimate criteria for recognizing a given cornmunal 
group a日astate i日tobe ba:狩don who is actually providing order. 
Neofunctinali思tsancl le符.llist円 concurwith realists ancl 1iberal日 in
identi:(ving the discrepancy between thゃjuridicaland the empirical 
attributeぉ01'statdlood a目立。n出titutingthe coro of the crises. Func-
tionalists and le広aIistsuphold the viむwthat most of today's weak 
states， as created by the colonialists and inaugurated on the day of 
independenee， have proved inherently il1capablo of coping with the 
economic， pりliticaIand附 curitydemand日 ofthe modern era， and 
that the way to overむomethi自problemis to integrate these 8tates 
into 80me regional (1，e. contirwntall 01' sub叫regionalentities.同 Where
the two schoo18 diverge from realism's line of ar事lmentis in the 
constitutional OI' P巴acθfulmeans they suggest: 'it i日desirablefor a 
group of the日estate月toband together into an economic community 
that will also be a security eommunity and， eventually， a political 
community withぉover日i試行 right札制
Which of the above間関内tionsmakes more開 nseboth in the情
。ryand practice? It seemぉalmostcertain that solutions based on 
foree 01' on the realist CIマterionof who is actually controlling larger 
territory and providing order entail deeper moral and practical 
problems. Morally， the solution is unaeceptable to many simply be回
???
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cause it is based on the iniquitous idea of 'might makes 1'ight'. Let 
us also 1'emind ourselves that it is not always easy to accurately dか
te1'mine who is effectively p1'oviding o1'de1'， when and whe1'e.87 Real-
ist solutions also make the states mo1'e vulne1'able to what is called 
the domino theo1'y of secession in巴.xtremisin which 'if a society had 
a 1'ight to p1'oclaim its will and secede f1'om the majo1' unit， eve1'y 
dist1'ict， every town， eve1'y village， eve1'y farm日teadcould decla1'e it-
self independent.削 The‘widesp1'ead mingling of peoples' furthe1' 
complicates this matter."!l While in the long run the idea of region-
alism merits se1'ious consideration， it appea1's that building a viable 
state within the existing f1'amework ought to precede othe1' steps fo1' 
dealing with the challenges of state failures and dome臼ticanarchy. 
It has been pointed out above that 1'ealism offers乱solutionthat 
essentially boils down to a proposal fo1' the granting of international 
recognition to whoever is providing political order over a territory 
with a significant size and population. Such a prescription is logi-
cally sound and persuasive. In practice， however， itraises more 
problems than it solves and fails to address the problem of legiti凶
macy and citizenship discussed above. The alleged solution could 
be eonceived as the outcome of a ze1'o副sumgame. 1n ef1ect， order 
may not provide answer to al the issues relevant to dome日ticanar-
chy. As the French philosopher ，Jean Jacques Rouseau aptly asked 
very long ago，‘Life is tranquil in jail cells， too. 1s that reason 
enough to like themア Thissame question seems to underlie the bゃ
liefs of millions of people who take up arms to challenge the central 
authority. 
It can be said that force仇Ilineorporation of groups of people to 
one's territory， which is essentially what the realist白olutionboils 
down to， isalso misguided and dangerous. It is misguided beeause 
it is not directed at the twin crIses of legitimaey and citizenship， 
which we have identified above as constituting the eo1'e of the prob-
?????
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1em. It is dangerous because it will allow the prob1em to go on un-
abated， and most like1y， inan expanded form. Even if it were theo・
retically established that the panacea for the prob1em of domestic 
anarchy 1ies in traversing along such Darwinist path， the human 
and material costs of waging a war wou1d certainly outweigh the a1-
1eged gain白. The modernity and easy accessibi1ity of weaponry even 
to the weakest states a1so make such a project extreme1y cost1y. 
In what appears to be a twist of historical irony， realism in this 
case seems to advocate a return to the old era when ‘might made 
right'. Even if the groups enjoying the upper hand at a particular 
point in time could provide a sort of political order over a disputed 
蛇ηitoryand are internationally recognized as the legitima加 repre-
sentatives of the state， the pro回ssof domination (real or perceived) 
and resistance is likely to continue. The changing balance of power 
that feeds on the changes in the structure of the international and 
domestic political systems make it more， rather than less， likely for 
the vicious circle of the crises of legitimacy and citizenship to con-
tinueαd in.βnitum， thereby taking the ‘states' much more closer to 
the Hobbesian ‘state of nature'. Conquering a weak neighbor might 
bolster the extractive capacity of the conqueror. But it is not self-
evident that this would help the newly invented state to forge a 
common identity， not 1east because wars of this kind leave in their 
wake a memory that cou1d not easily be deleted， especially in the 
minds of the vanquished. The newly ama1gamated people are also 
bound to perceive the new state as their prison， not their home， and 
the leaders as conquerors， not emancipators. 
The idea that political boundaries shou1d be revised so that sub 
-regional communities will replace the current arrangement based 
on nation咽statesis excellent and attractive one. This functionalist 
prescription， which is based on the theoretical supposition that be-
haviors cou1d be explained in terms of their effects， appears to have 
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identified one of the sources of the chronic crises that have affiicted 
many states as being the arbitrary， and sometimes forceful， incorpo-
ration of territories and peoples that had nothing in common. But 
when it comes to the mechanisms of implementing such a proposal， 
several problems are likely to arise owing again to the processes by 
which these states had been created and maintained. In other 
words， for legalistic-functionalist solution to work， inaddition to a 
strong political will towards this end， the political economy of the 
states ought also to be of such a nature that it is able to sustain re-
gional integration. But today that does not seem to hold true in 
many cases. 
It has also been argued above that the st1'uctu1'al att1'ibutes of 
the international system play a cruciaJ role in inf1uencing the out-
come of the c1'ises of legitimacy and citizenship that take the form 
of a challenge to a日tau.ε‘ Thenormat“ive fむ:1'[汽11
tiona]呂y白te臼m doe日not，however， pJay a prima1'Y role in the incep-
tion of the crises. Therefore， while recognizing the fact that norma崎
tive attributes of the international自ystemdo affect the t1'ansforma凶
tion of dysfunctional input日 overtime、itis neither p1'oductive no1' 
p1'udent to place the main focus on the externaI envi1'onment in 
dealing with domestic ana1'ehy. 
Mo1'eover， even if ev叶eneesuggests that external facto1's play 
more crucial role than domestic filetors in regard to the problem un-
der discussionヲ curativemeasures should be more inward“looking 
since it is easier to Inf1uence domestie politiむalsystmlls than the 
former which inc1ude international legal and diplomatic praeticesゐ
Again， even if international 1・ulesand norms could he '(re) con-
structed'， f，riven the political wi1l of a large number of states (01' at 
least the most powerfi.lJ aI110ng thernl， the task would prove to be 
complex and time尉consuming“ Outward.]ookingmeasure日 arenot 
also worth the whi!e since， a自indicatedabovc， the p1叶)lemcouid be 
iヰi
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best tackled more effectively and directly if the cure is sought from 
within the political system just in the same way as an effective vac-
cine to an ailment is developed from the vector. And yet， itis use-
ful， for a fuller diagnosis of the problem and its metamorphosis 
overtime to look also into the workings of the normative framework 
of the international system in relation to their subtle influences. 
In a nutshell， our principal tentative conclusion is that neither 
secession nor war of conquest is likely to solve the problems of do-
mestic anarchy. Different communal groups engage in challenging 
their states because they do not believe their rulers have the right 
to rule them and/or they believe that they do not enjoy an even-
handed rule. Regionalism is premature for the reasons discussed 
above. Decentralization of political power may be the realistic op-
tion. The structural barriers that stand in the way of undertaking 
genuine decentralization in these states should not be underesti-
mated， however. It is also worthwhile noting that our specific sug-
gestion of decentralization of power as a possible cure to sta加 faiI-
ure is in no way definitive. 1'his is due， inpart， tothe fact that al-
though a decentralized government is theoretically the preferred 
form of government， even such liberal thinkers as J. S. Mill did not 
advocate for its application under al circumstances. Mill wrote in 
this regard : 
When nations， thus divided， are under a despotic gov告rnmentwhich is 
stronger to aIl of them， or which， though sprung from one， yet feeling 
greater interest in its own power than any sympathies of nationality， a自-
signs no privilege to either nations， and chooses its instruments indifer-
ently from a1l; in the course of a few generation， identity of自ituationoften 
produces harmony of feeling， and the different races come to fl白elωwards
????
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As for solutions that are oriented towa1'ds democratization of 
the political system， 1'ecent empi1'ical findings do not appear to offe1' 
a solid suppo1't fo1' its curative effect on domestic ana1'chy under cer-
tain conditions.flJ It nevertheless appears that generally inwa1'd-
looking measures will have to be taken both as a curative and pre-
ventive medicine against the phenomenon of domestic ana1'chy be-
cause the essential ingredients i.e. the crises of legitimacyαnd citi-
zenship， are generated from within. 
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. modernism in r向‘冶elatio開ntωo 0ぱth恥eラヨr日cぬho∞ols日 in int託白ernaぱ州t“io開nは叫a1r刊eh日抗山1誌tl附on削1悩自 呂悦e叩e鳥ラ Por此'オte白r
(は1994:105ふ-127).On po日討itiv判3日m，Pop】per(1968: a41 had this to 内抗Y''The older 
positivist日 wishedto admit， as scjpntific or lpgitimate噌 onlytho民ecooeepts (or 
notions or ideas which were， as they put it， 'derived from pxperience': those 
concepts， i.e" which they believed to 1(' hJh>IcaJly l'('ducihle to elemむ111只 ()f問 nse
experience. ' 
}I. 
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品 Fora summary of the differentぬrmsethnic and other movements can take 
see， Jalali and Lipset (1992: 586). 
25 This hypothesis is arrived at through a combination of deductive as well as in剛
ductive reasoning. For a clear discussion the distinctions between the two see 
Popper (1968). 
2. See， Walzer (1995: 10); and Warner (1995: 45-47). 
?:l In the Aristotelian (Greek) understanding of citizenship， the notion si伊.ifiesa 
person who both rules and is ruled. It excludes slaves and women. In a sense， 
the Aristotelian understanding was thus political. Five centuries later， there 
evolved the Roman understanding of the concept in which legal aspect was em-
phasized:‘the status of a citizen αme to denote membership in a community of 
shared or common law， which may or may not be identical with a territorial 
community.' See， Pocock (1995: 29-52). There are crucial differences in the 
meanings attached to 'citizenship' even in countrie白 knowntoday as liberal de-
mocracies. For a well-documented and conciωly comparative analysis of the dif-
ferent c唖nceptionsof citizen出hipin four liberal democracies see， Sa仕an<1997: 
313・315).
胡 Nettl(1968: 561). For this reason， the notion state is unfitting and its usage 
needs reconsideration. For such reconsideration， Sorensen's (1998: 256-264) re-
cent typology of contell1porary states into post回colonial，Westphalian and post-
modern state could he an excellent starting point. 
四 Warner(1995: 45-47) separates the畠巴巴lementsinto three: civil， political and 
legal. 'The civil element of citizenship is a positive form which， on the basis of 
equality， people can make certain claims against each other and/or against the 
governl1ent. The political element is that which allows an individual to partici-
pate in the decision of the government or to he a member of出atgovernment. 
Both th日politicaland civil elements are part of what could he called the ‘ohjec-
tive' elements of citizenship. ln terms of political theory， itcould be argued that 
the objective political and civil elemer山 arepart of tOO vertical contract be-
tween citizens and a government. The social element of citizenship is the hori-
zontal contract in society， the subjective elell1ent in citizenship.' ln Europe， as 
elsewhere， the three elements of citizenship did not emerge at the same time. 
According to T. H. Marshall， quot沼din Warner (1995: 49)， the civil right日be-
long to the formative period of the eighteenth century， political rights to the 
ninetωnth century and social fights to the twentieth century. 
???
初 KOI百hauser(1964:151) 
出 Statele伊timacyin the eyes of its cItizens should be distinguished from inter-
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national legitimacy and in this paper by legitimacy it is meant the former which 
denotes 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain位lebelief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society.' See， 
Scharr (1984). The latter is referred to as international recognition， or simply 
reco伊 ition. For a discussion of the distinction between the two see， Jackson 
and Roseberg (1982: 7). 
担 Quotedin Beetham (1991: 6). Janos (1964: 132) offers a definition which 
roughly resembles that of Weber. Legitimacy， for him， isthe ability to evoke 
compliance short of coercion. It is a psychological relationship between masses 
and elites， involving acceptance by the masses a claim by an elite to act in the 
name of the community. 
拍 Beetham(1991: 19) 
34 At one point， Beetham (1991: 23-25) refers to Weber's theoηof legitimacy as 
‘one of the blindest of blind alleys in the history of social science.' 
時 Fora discussion of the different dimensions of legitimacy and the problems as-
sociated with them see， Ibid.， 3-41. 
捕 Scharr(1984: 109). The notion of popular reaction ωstimulators is ∞n自is-
tent with James Rosenau's idea of ‘skill revolution' as a result of which individu晴
als tend to judge the legitimacy of their rulers on the basis of the policy outputs 
rather than through the mere criterion of the mechan:ism by which leaders as-
sume ofice.‘Historically，' declared Rosenau and Durf白e(1995: 76)，‘the author-
ity structures have been founded on traditional criteria of legitimacy derived 
from constitutional and legal sources...the sources have [nowl shifted from tradi-
tional to performance criteria of legitimacy.' 
"， Danziger (1991: 374). 
胡 Sorensen(1997: 260). 
四 Rothchildand Groth (1995: 78) . 
. '0See， Flexner and Flexner (2000: 6). 
叫 Nettl(1968: 590-591). 
42 This representation is from John S Mill. See， Dahbour and Ishay (1995: 590-
591). 
'" Exclusive authority is authority that is believed to be inaccessible to large sec-
tion of the population， alien authority is authority that is believed to be foreign 
rather than indigenous to the society especially authority imposed from without 
and displaying symbols of an alien culture; arbitrary authority is authority 
that is believed to be capricious and irresponsible. For discussions， see Korn・
hauser (1964: 134). 
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" A cautionary note日 herein order regarding the problematic concept of‘na-
tionalism・Hahand Martin (1975: 360) delined nationalism as ' consisting of 
organizationally heightened and articulated 1，'I'oup demands， directed toward se-
curing control of the distributive system in a society.' The usefulness of this 
definition is its amenability to operationalization. But a stricter application of 
the definition will lead onc to believ巴thata trade union movement or an army 
revolt could be considered as constituting a nationali日tmovement. In fact， this 
is not necessarily 50. Sueh definition diminishcs the utility of the concept for 
our purpose. Furthermore， we wou1d avoid refc巴rcnceto this term as much as 
pos5ible because when the existence of a fully developed state itse1f is question-
able， itdoes not make much sense to ta1k about nationalism. As Gellner (1994 : 
4) notes，‘[tJhe existencc of politically centra1ized units， and of a mora1-political 
climate in which such centralized units arc taken for granted and are treated as 
normative， isa necessary though by no means a sufficient condition for nation齢
alism. 
いSee，Motyl (1991: 3). For a brief review of the ditTerent views on the origin， 
essence and manifestations of nationalism see， Kellas (1991: 34-50). 
W According to Stokes (1978: 150)， one reason for the thinness of a theory of na-
tionalism， despite the enormity of the literature on the phenomena， isthe fact 
that until a short time ago 110日tof the investigators of the subject have been 
historian自， who， as a group tend to be more interested in description than expla-
nation. 
j) Motyl (1991: 1-24). 
" Ande1'son (19~l5: 6) 
'" Weber (].964・156)
" Ra'anan (1991: 8) thUK clearly 8Ulllmarizes the widespread (albeit wrong) 
view with regard to the evolutionary development of the institution of the nation 
-state:古!J:osteconomic and political planners of the 1940 s and 1950 s argued 
that the concept 01' the modern nation-state wa符 bomduring the 16th and the 
17th centuries， in the bureaucratically centralized， post-medieval societies of 
Western Europe--Britain， France， the Netherlands. By the 19th century， so they 
claimed， following the French revolutionary e1段boration01' the idea ()f‘la nation'， 
and the reaction to the Napoleonic expansjonist drive fo1' conquest， nationalism 
had reached Central Europe， leading eventually to the formation of unitary 
states in Germany and ltaly，社ndthen had moved eastward to the Balkans， east 
Central and Eastenl Europe， which became known， par excellence as the hot-
beds of nationa1 strife. By the 20'" century， the wave had moved stil 1'arther， to
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics NO.32.2002 
the so called Middle East， and eventually it had reached the rest of colonial Asia 
and Mrica.' 
日 See，Shultz (1995: 79). Kupchan's (1995: 1) typology of nationalism inω 
civic and ethnic also runs along the same lines. For him， ethnic nationalism de-
fines nationhood in terms of lineage. Civic nationalism defines nationhood in 
terms of citizenship and political participation. Civic nationalism does favor so・
cial cohesion and political equality in ethnically heterogeneous political commu-
nities. Similarly， Rothchild and Groth (1995: 69-82) identi今thefollowing as 
the two principles of what they called ethnonationalism:‘the excIusiveness of 
the national group's definition based upon particular criteria; and the mainte-
nance of internal cohesion and loyalty to the group on the basis of perceived 
threats from those outside its confines.' 
日 Gurr(1968: 245-248). 
同 Hahand Martin (1975: 380). 
54 Olzak (1998: n 
5 Hah and Martin (1975: 380). For a good review and analysis of this subject 
see， Fe訂'Onand Laitin (2000: 845-877). 
同Almond(1986: 41・72)
57 Gurr (1980: 191-209). For a different classi伍cation，see Olzak ( 1998: 192暢
197). 
組 AsSamatar (1997: 695) relates this explanationωthe situati'On in S'Omalia， 
‘…unlike the 'Old pl'巴-c'OI'Onial'Order in which the elders did n'Ot c'Ontr'Ol either a 
c'Oercive machine 'Or ec'On'Omic p'Ower 'Over the c'Ommunity， the imp'Ositi'On 'Of col'O-
nialism 'On S'Omalia rem'Oved the maj'Or social means 'Of restraining th'Ose in p'O唱i-
ti'On 'Of power.' 
油 Qu'Otedin Herbst (1987: 64). 
帥 Mill(1861) in Dahbour and Ishay (1991: 101). 
61 As Rothchild and Gr'Oth (1995) n'Oted，‘the pr'Oblem 'Of psychol'Ogical displace-
ment 'Of deprivati'On， frustrati'On and uncertainty is likely ωbe m'Ost a叩 te
among the S'O called divided nati'Onalities. F'Or th'Ose gr'Oups classificd as m司j'Ori-
tarian within a particular area， the min'Ority cntitie白areeasily identifiable， vis舗
ible， and tangible targets f'Or this displacement. The psych'OlogicaUy‘helpful' en-
emy does not have t'O be invented. H巴i白theref'Or al to sce.' 
出 Haggardand Simons (1987: 496). 
削 Walzer(1992: 323). 
制Ke'Ohane(1986・1・27).
尉 Herbst(1989: 673-692). 
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師 Keohane(1986: 8). 
.7 Ibid.， 9.
田 Herbst(1989: 690). 
開 Acontrasting ar伊 mentwas advanced by Saideman (1997: 722):‘the ethnic 
ties (or enmities) between a politician's supporters and the combatants in ethnic 
conflicts in other states help to explain the policies of states toward secessionist 
crises.' 1 have elsewhere tried to demonstrate that Saideman's thesis is not sup-
port吋 bythe situation in the Horn of A金ica.See my， ConceptuaJizing the Proc-
esses姐 dStructural Determinants of State Formation and State Disintegra-
tion: A Case Study of the Horn of Africa， Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation， Uni-
versity of Tsukuba， 1999， especially pp. 72・73.
70 Modelski (1961-124). 
71 Heraclides (1991: 71). 
72 Ibid.， 39. 
時Ibid.，152. 
，. Modelski (1961: 19). 
・ After studying the nature of the early African states， Donald Kurtz (1981: 
177) concludedぬatthe legitimacy of the authority structures of early states 
was essential for their survival and their legitimation is an exorable and inte-
gral part of the process of early state development...states have to attain legiti-
macy if they are to rule by means other than naked force and long survive the 
tests ofhis:ωry. 
76 Almond (1986: 68-69). 
円 Heraclides(1991: 11). 
7' Evera (1995: 150-151). 
79 Hanf (1991: 40・43).
同 Fora different classification of IR theories in regard to their positions on the 
issue of self-de総rmination，see Freeman (1999: 335-370). 
削Itshould be clear that the classification of each idea into one or another school 
in IR is made solely onぬebasis of the judgment of this writer and hence it 
could be at variance with classifications by others. For example， Freeman's 
(1999: 365) description of what a realist theory of self-determination is signifi-
cantly different from mine. For him， such theories have two properties 1) they 
endorse only those conceptions of the right to national self-determination that 
could be accepted by the power-holders (particularly， states) in the contemporary 
world; 2) they accord priority to the stability of the existing state sysぬm.For 
a detailed discussion of the taxonomy see， Freeman (1999: 355・370);for a co・
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gent analysis of thi白themefrom a world systems perspective se巴， Olzak (1998 : 
187-217). 
担 Herbst(1997: 120). 
削 Herbst(1997: 120). 
削 Lind(1994: 87-112). 
同 Mukisa(1997 : 24). Riggs (1998) elaborates another reason why secession does 
not provide an answer to the problem of divided soCIeties: '...ethnic nationalism 
prevails among marginalized communities in modern states whose members re-
ject citizenship and demand sovereignty. They normally have a territorial base 
or‘homeland' which， infact 01' fantasy can anchor thc state they wish to estab-
lish by liberation or secession. However‘population mobility has led to a wide-
spread mingling of peoples， not only in cities but also in rural areaR‘seriously 
hampering efforts to carve independent states out 01' the enclaves which eth-
nonational movements c1aim for themselves.' 
制 Mukisa(1997: 24). 
師 Inaddition to geographical fluidity of the territorial space， intemporal teγms 
as well the issue is not as clear-cut as it appears at first glance. In the case of 
Algeria for example， there are claims 'that certain刈 burl泊。fAlgerian cities are 
under the control of the authorities during the day and the control of Islamic 
militants at night.' See， Mazrui (1994: 28)。
制 Osterud(1997: 70); L目 C.Buchheit reler's to this llotion as the problem of 'Ilト
definite divisibility.' Quoted in Frecman (1998: 360) 
師 Riggs(1998: 278) 
90 Dahbour and Ishay (1995: 103). For a bri(l{' discussion of why Mill's prescrip命
tion is irrelevant to our times see， W旦lzer<1992: 324】325)
>ll Smith (2000: 34) concluded th呂tthe findings of his ernpirical research Ol Af~ 
rica‘allow u日neitherto accept nor to reject the hypothesis that democratization 
leads to lower ethnic conf1ict.' Gurr et al (1999: 5) also summed up the result 
of their OWll extensive empirical work in these terms :にm 只ub-SaharanAfrica， 
other things being equal， partial democracies were on average 11 times more 
likely to fail than autocracy.' 
165 
166 
Domestic Anal'chy : Tow呂rdsA Constitutive 
Model of 8tate Di剖ntq，1ration
Bibliogr，αphy 
Almond， G.( 1986人、A Developmental Approach to Poliiical 8ystems'， in 1 
Kabashima and W. Lvnn (ed品)‘ PoliticalSvstem 日目dChange， Princeton 
University Press， Princeton 
Anderson， B.il991J， lm.agincd Communities: Reflections on thl' Origin日nd
Spread of NatIοnalism， Vcrso， London， New York. 
Arfi， B.(19981， '8tate C()llap川口1a New Theo!'etical Framework:τ'he Case of 
Yugoslavi乳"1nlernatiul!a! Journal o{ Sociolcほれ vol.28， no. 3. pp. 15-42.. 
Beetham， D.(1991)、TheLegitunaliol! of' Power， New Jersey， Humanities Press 
International. 
Dahbour，O司 anclM. Ishay 09951， The N日tionali仰 LR叩 der，Humanities Press， 
Ncw Jersey 
Danzigcr， ，J.N.r1991i， Un(I"/'"t日ndingthe Poli!ic臼fWorld: An 1ntroductioll to 
p，οliuwl Science， Longm註n守LondonヲNewYork. 
Drudunan， D.( 1994)， 'Nationalism. Patriotism. and Group Loyalty: A 80cial 
pぉycholog.icalPerspective'， Mershon 引 !iatiol1alStlldies Review， vol. 38， 
no. 1， pp. 43-68 
Evera， 8.(1995)， 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and the Causes ()f War'， inC. Kup-
ch江口(代1)，Natiolw/isll1. and入latlOnafitiω inNew Europe， Cornell University 
Prc副長宅 Ithnca，Londonι 
B'riedman， ，J(1998)， '1'ra口市'1ationalizatiol1‘ Socio-politicalDisorder ancl Ethnifica-
tion aぉ ExpressIonsof DecJining Global Economy'. 1nternational Political 
8cience Hどドt.el仏 vo1.9， no. :3， pp. 2:33-250. 
Fn、eman，M'(19991， 'The Right to Self-Determinatiれnin International Politics 
Six 'lhu(川州 inSearch 01' a Policy'， Review o( 11<:1・national島Studies，vol. 25， 
no. 3， pp. 355-370. 
Gashman， G.(19931， IVh口tCα川 esW:日r.An 1山口ductionto 11tel・叩tionalConβict， 
Lexin耳tonBooks， New York. 
Gellner， E.( HJ94)， Naliolls日ndl'Vat:ionalisl/l嘗Blaekwell，Oxford. 
Gurr， T.(2000)，泡thnicWarf'I!'u on th(盃Wane'，Foreign Aflcurs， May!June， pp. 52 
-64 
119市0)写 Tltllidhooho( Poli!I U:/ C'ol/flict. 'lheolヲundHesearch， Free Press， New 
York 
( Hl6刷、?町一仁hoIogicalFado1'>' in Civil Vio!(、Ilce'.World Politics， vol. 20， no， 2， 
いp.245-2i8
Gurr， T. et. al (1999)，、Stat.eFailure Task F'ot'c(': Phase I Findings'， Ent'iron-
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics NO.32.2002 
ment日lChange日ndSecllrity Project Repol't， Issue 5， pp. 49-72. 
Haggard， S.and B. Simmon日 (1987)，‘Theories()f International Regimes'， Inter-
nαtionalOrg.αnization， vol. 41， 110. 3， pp. 491-517. 
Hah， C. al1d J. Martin (1975)，‘Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration 
Theorie目。fNationalism'，Wo，.ld Politics， voJ. 27，2， pp. 361凹386
Hammol1d， J.(1999)， Fire β'OIn the Ashes: A Chronicle of the Revolution in Ti-
gray， Ethiopia， 1975-1.991， Lawrenceville， N.，]: The Red Sea Press. 
Hal1f， T.(1991)， 'Reducing Conflict Through Cultural Autonomy: Karl Renner's 
COl1tribution'， inU. Ra'anan et aUeds)， Stateαnd Nation in Multiethnic So-
cieties: The B，-叩 kupo{ Multinational Stat叫 ManchesterUniversity Press， 
Mal1chester， New York. 
Helman， G. and S. Ratnl1er (1993)，‘Saving Failed States'， Foreign Polic.γ， no. 89， 
pp.3-20 
Heraclides， A.(1991)， The Self-Determinatum of Mi!loriti倒的 1nternatio!l口lPO{i-
tics， Frank Cass， London. 
Herbst， J.(1997)，‘Responding to State Failure in Africa'， 1nfernatio/!α1 Securi恥
vol. 21， no. 30， pp. 117-139. 
Herb日t，J (1990)， 'War and State in Africa'， InternatIol/.al SecUlぜか， vol. 14， No. 4， 
pp.117-139. 
一.(1989)，'The Creation and Maintenance of Nationai Boundaries in Africa'， 1n悶
ternatlonαlOrganiz日tion，vol. 43、no.，4‘67:3町692
Jackson， R司 and C. Roseberg (1982)，‘Why Afric丘、 W問 kState日 Persist:1'he 
Empirical and The Juridical in Statehood'ヲWOl'ldPolitics， vol. 35， no. 1， pp. 
1-24 
Jalali， R. and M. Lipset (1992)，‘Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Per自pec-
tive'， Political Science QllC1l'terly， vol. 107， n札 4.pp. 585-606 
Janos， A.(1964J，‘Authority and Violence: 1'he Political Framowork 01' Intemal 
War'， in H. Eckstein (edJ， Internal War: P/'oblemsαnd Approaches， The 
Free Press， New York. 
Kellas‘J.(1991)， The Po1itics o/' Nationαlism ond ldentity， M.acmillan， London. 
Keohane， R. .(1986)， 'Reciprocity in International Relations'， [nternationαlOI'-
g日niz日tion，vol. 40， no. 1. pp‘ 1-27 
Kornhauser， W.(1964J， 'Rebellion and PoJitical Dcvejopment'， in H. Eckstcin (ed)， 
1nternal War: p，吋 lemB口ndApproac!zes， 1'h8 Fr閃 Pres円， New York. 
Kupchan， C.(1995J， 'Introduction: Nationalism R制 m、gent'， in C. Kupchan (cdl， 
Nationalism and Na[Iona/itics il1 New Europe， Cornell Universit.y Press司
Ithaca， London. 
。
167 
iL 
16お
Domestic Anal'chy : Towards A Constitutive 
Model of State Disintegration 
Kurtz， D.( 1981)， 'The Legitimation of Early Inchoate States'， in H. Classen and 
P. Salnik (eds)， The Stud;γofthe Stαte， Mouton Publishers， The Ha♂五e.
Lind， M.n9941，‘1n Defence of Liberal Nationalism'， Foreign Affairs， vol. 73， no 
3， pp. 87-112. 
Lipson， C.il984)，‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs'， 
World Politics， vol. 37， no. 1， pp‘1-23. 
Mazrui， A.(1994)， 'The Blood of Experience. The Failed State and Political Col-
lapse in Africa'， World Policy Joumal， vol. 12， no. 1， pp. 28-34. 
McFerson， H.(1996)， 'Rethinking Ethnic Conflict.(Somalia and Fiji)'， American 
Behavioral Scientist， vol. 40. no. 1 
ModelskiヲG.(1961)、TheIntemational Relαtions o/Internαl War， Plinceton Uni-
versity Press， Princeton 
Motyl， A.(1991)， 'The Modernity Nationalism: Nations， States and Nation-
Stat凶 int弘、 ContemporaryWorld'， The Journal of lnternational Af/airs， 
vol. 45， no岨 2，pp. 307四323.
Mueller， ，J.(2000)， 'The Banality of 'Ethnic Wa1'， International Security， vol. 25， 
no. L 42-70. 
Mukisa， R.n997l， 'Toward A Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries'， 
Afiu，a Today， vol司 44，no. 1， pp. 7-82. 
Nettl‘，J.<19681， 'The St<山 AsA Conceptual Variable'， Wo1'ld Politics， vol. 20， no. 
4， pp. 559-592 
Neuman今 8.(1991).‘DoesModernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?' World 
Politics， vol. 48， no. 8， pp食 451-478.
01zak令 8.(1998)，'Ethnic Prot附 tin Core and Periphery 8tate臼，Ethnic and Ra-
ciα18tudies， voJ. 21， no‘2， pp. 187-217. 
Oommen‘T.l199TI， Citizen.ship， N臼tionali~y 即日iEthnicity， Po]ity Press， Corn回
wall. 
Osterud， 0.(1997)， 'The Narrow Gate:日ntryinto the Club of 80vereign 8tate日:
Review o/Intenational Stlldics， vol. 23， no. 2， pp. 167-184. 
Pocock， ，J.( 1995)，げfheIdea of Citizenship 8ince Classica] Times'， in R. Beinen 
(ed)， l'hl'orizing Citizcnship， State University ofNew Yo1'k Pre白日， Albany. 
Poppcr， K.( lDG8l， The Logic o/8cienlific D附 COUe1:y，Harper & Row， New York. 
Porter， T.(1994l司 'PostmodernPoJitical Realism and 1nternational Relations The-
ory's Third Debate'， inC. 8jolander and W. Cox (eds)， Beyond Positivism; 
Criticαl Ref7ectioll対 onlntemational Relations， Lynne Rienner， Boulder， 
London. 
Ra'anan， U.09911， 'Natiol1 and 8tate: O1'de1' Out of Chaos'， inU. Ra'anan et al. 
The Tsukuba University ，Journal of Law and Politics NO.32.2002 
(eds)， State alld N，αtion i旧日 Multi.ethnicSocieties: The Breakup ol Multi恥
nαtIol!al States， Manchester University Press， Manchester， New York. 
Riggs， F.09981， 'The Modernity of E:thnic Identity and Conflict'， International 
Political Science Review， vol. 19， no. 8， pp. 269-288. 
Rosenau， J.(1990)， Tllrbulellce in World Politics. A. TheOl:γofCh臼nge白ndConli戸
l1ity， Princet刀nUniversity Press， Princeton， NJ. 
一.(1995)，‘Security in a 1、urbulent.World'， Current Hist01:Y.ゐI円1α1of Contet!1・
porary World A.flairs， vol. 94， no. 592， pp. 193.200 
Rothchild， D. and A. Groth (1995)， 'Pat.hological Dimen日ionsof Domestic and In-
ternational E:tbnicity'， Politicαl Science Qllarterry， vol. 110， no. 1， pp. 69-82 
Sa1'ran， W.(19971，‘Citizenship and Nationality in Demoeratic Systems: Ap目
proaches to Dcfinin耳andAcquiring Memben，hip in the Political Commu匂
nity'， Internationα1 Politicα1 Science Reuiew， vol. 8， no. 8， pp. 818.885.. 
Saideman， S.(1997)，‘E:xplaining the International ReJati作抗日 ofSece市当ioniぉtC()!l' 
flicts: Vulnernhility Versus gthnic Tie自，lntemutimwl 0，ヌ司nization，vol 
51， no. 4， pp. 721.15a. 
Samarasinghe， Sλ1990)， 'Introduction'， S.Samarasinghe et al.ieds)， SecessionIst 
Mouements in Compul'臼tiuep，引'specln'ιPinter，Lonc!o!l 
Samatar， A.(1997)，‘Leader日hipanc! Ethnicity in t!w Making of Afl'Ican State 
ModelR: Bot削wanaand Somali丘二 TlzirdWorld Quarterl:仏、101.18. no. 4， pp. 
687“707. 
Scharr， ，1.(1984)， 'Legitimacy in the Modern Statc'， inW. Connolly (吋)， Legiti-
t!1acy a/1d the State， Basil Blackwell、Oxford仇
Shultz， R.(l995J， 'State Disinte‘gration and E:thnic Confliet: A Fr日me，九IOrkfor 
Analysi日" The A.nnals ol the A.mel'icαn Acαdemy of Politicα1 (Jnd Soci日1Sci. 
ences， no. 541. pp. 75-88 
Smith， Z.(2000)， 'The Impad 01' Political Liberalization and Democratization on 
Etlmic Conflict in AfI'ica: 1¥n Empirical T刊 tofCommon A州 umptiol1s'，The 
Jour/1.αl ol Modern A.fricαn Studies， vol. 88， 110. ]， pp. 21-:39 
Sorensen， G.t19971， 'An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for 
Conflict and Coope但r、苫百正ation'，ReむIθ剖tιu(叶>{'InfれClリナr‘ηαfがio/1.(，ιdStμdi配es人ク vul.ι 23ヲ pp. 258-
269 
Stokes， G.(1978)， 'The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism'， ¥Vorld Politics， vol. 
81， no. 1， pp. 150-160. 
Tilley， V.( 1997)， 'The Tcrms 01' thc Debate: Unt札ng!ingLangu日宮eAbout E:thnIc. 
ity and E:thnic Movementぜ，Ethnicαnd Racial 8tudiのす， vo1. 20， no. 8， pp白
497-522. 
J¥. 
169 
七170 
Domestic Anarchy : Towards A Constitutive 
Modelof8t呂teDisintegration 
Walzer， M.( 1995)， 'Citizenship'， inT. Ball et al.(eds)， Political 112no(lαtion and 
Conceptuα1 Change， Cambridge University Press， New York. 
Warner， D.(1995)，ζCitizenship and Identity: A Double Reading of the Identity 
Crisis'， in A. Liebich巴tal.(cds)， Citizenship: East and West， Kegan Paul 
International， London， New York. 
Weber， M.( 1958)， The Protωtant Ethicαnd thどSpiritοfじ:apitαlism，trans. by T 
Parsons， Charles Scribner's Sons， New York. 
Wendt， A.(l998)， 'On Constitution and Causation in lntむrnationalRelations'， Re-
uiew ul1ntemationα1 Studies， 8pecial Issu日， vol. 24， pp. 101-117. 
